OBJECTIVITY AND SCIENCE

OBJECTIVITY AND SCIENCE

Abstract

The aim of this study is to evaluate whether objectivity is possible within the realm of science. In addition, the thoughts of certain philosophers on this matter have been examined.

Some philosophers have developed certain methodologies to argue that objectivity can be achieved in science. Logical positivists and Popper are among them. However, thinkers like Feyerabend and Kuhn have opposed these ideas, claiming that complete objectivity cannot be attained in science, and they have put forth their own perspectives.

Keywords: Science, Objectivity, Subjectivity, Objectivity in Science

Introduction

The concept of objectivity in science has been a controversial topic in the philosophy of science for many years. Thoughts on objectivity in science have also made it possible to contemplate the fundamental criteria that make science what it is.

The first section of the article discusses what objectivity means in science and why objectivity poses a problem. Furthermore, it delves into issues concerning the definition of objectivity. The meaning of subjectivity in science and the potential problems associated with subjectivity are also addressed.

The second section examines the thoughts of logical positivists, Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend regarding objectivity in science. In order to better understand their perspectives on objectivity, their respective understandings are partially explained.

Following these discussions, the conclusion section presents thoughts on the possibility of scientific objectivity and the position objectivity should occupy in science.


1. SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY

Scientific objectivity arises as a result of many factors used in science. This includes the methodology employed in science and the outcomes it produces, among many other things. Objectivity is thus one of the most significant factors that determine the authority of science (Özdemir, 2019: 6).

When evaluating this objectivity, it becomes evident that there is an objectivity problem within science. This objectivity problem manifests itself in issues such as the problem of induction, theory choice, evidence and statistical foundations, experimentation, measurement and quantification, and many more (Özdemir, 2019: 6). In this context, the questions that need to be asked are: "What is meant by objectivity in science?" or "Is it really possible to be objective in science?" However, before these questions, the question that needs to be asked is: "Is objectivity necessary in science?" "Is objectivity that important?"

In essence, when examined, science has many functions. The claim that science is objective elevates scientific knowledge to a superior position compared to other forms of knowledge. This is a matter that concerns not only those engaged in science but all individuals. People distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, based on scientific knowledge. If this scientific knowledge loses its claim to objectivity, then there will be no criteria to differentiate truth from falsehood, right from wrong in many matters. In such a case, reaching consensus on many issues will not be possible. So, is there really a need for such a differentiating criterion? Is achieving this consensus truly important?

The answer to this question is somewhat yes. This is because development is often based on the acceptance of certain foundations from various perspectives. The absence of consensus among these foundations would pose a significant obstacle to progress. Furthermore, the removal of such a consensus in the foundations would require reevaluating everything done from the past until now. The main reason for this obstacle would be the loss of authority in the eyes of people. If this authority is lost, various new barriers will emerge before science. From these perspectives, the production of objective knowledge by science has many functions. In other words, it should be realized that the objectivity of science is not only relevant to science itself.

A clearer example is needed to illustrate this point. If we evaluate the problem of induction mentioned above, it is assumed that a cause-effect relationship, when repeated in a certain number of instances in the same way, will continue to do so indefinitely. To provide a more specific example, we can consider the continuous downward motion of matter when not interfered with by any external conditions. This is caused by the force of gravity. Since this motion has occurred for thousands of years, there is an assumption that it will continue if no external conditions interfere. However, the problem here is that this assumption itself is not scientific. It is not based on experimentation and observation. It is not founded on a certain aspect of an "objective" reality. Even in a fundamental aspect like induction, which lies at the core of science, there is no consensus among all scientists and philosophers of science. The claim that the gravitational force cannot be fully objectively established within science and the popularization of this claim would significantly change the perception of science. Despite these debates within science, the reason why the perception of science has not changed is largely due to the lack of popularity of these debates. In science, the refutation of certain strong theories and their replacement by others is not seen as a problem related to objectivity by societies, but rather as a result of new discoveries. Therefore, when looked at, the issue of objectivity in science should actually be considered a significant problem. To approach this debate, it is necessary to start with the following question: "What should be understood by objectivity?"

Essentially, in the context of objectivity, various different meanings can be attributed to it in many different fields. Scientificity, rationality, methodology, objectivity, truth are some of these meanings. (Kılıç, 1997: 7). At this point, the lack of a common consensus on objectivity is also one of the fundamental problems. However, if we were to explain objectivity in its literal sense:

Objectivity refers to the condition of not being dependent on subjectivity. Here, two different meanings can be distinguished. The first one refers to the shared attitude of all subjects, while the second one denotes approaching the object independent of all subjective inclinations.

In terms of the perspective on nature, objectivity is concerned with representing the object as it is. (Üner, 2014: 55). From this perspective, the second type of meaning is used. From an epistemological point of view, objectivity represents the state of theories and concepts produced by humans being verifiable with facts. (Özlem, 2003: 158).

While it is related to the acquisition of correct knowledge about nature, it is related to what the truth in epistemology encompasses. (Özdemir, 2019: 8).

When evaluated in this context, science is expected to adhere to both types of objectivity. The verification of hypotheses and theories with facts is one of the fundamental tasks of science. However, although it is a controversial issue when looking at the first case, it is generally expected that a scientist should exclude many things such as their own feelings and beliefs when approaching an object. This is considered almost a duty of a scientist by many people. In fact, behaving otherwise can be perceived as a sign of misusing science. To provide an example in this regard:

During the Nazi Germany, science was under the control of the state. The field of medicine is also one of those areas where this issue arises. Many medical professionals have defended tortures and killings with a scientific basis. In this regard, the racist ideologies of that era had an impact on the field of medicine. In other words, the subject's beliefs have altered their perspective on the object. Due to the occurrence of similar events, many people believe that a scientist should not approach the object with their subjective inclinations.

At this point, the issue of subjectivity needs to be addressed. Subjectivity refers to the condition of characteristics, concepts, and the subject using these concepts being dependent on many attributes. (Cevizci, 2011: 345). In this sense, subjectivity stands in complete opposition to objectivity. From a scientific perspective, many things such as theories and hypotheses are dependent on the subject, in this case, the human who produces them. This situation raises the question of truth in science, as scientific propositions are so tied to individuals. Many people believe that scientific knowledge should be independent of subjectivity. Because in the case of subjectivity, there is no difference between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. In this context, the information provided by astrology is considered equal to the information provided by physics. The fact that there would be no difference between astrological knowledge and physics knowledge has also become a troubling issue for some thinkers. In this regard, some thinkers have attempted to develop new methodologies to differentiate scientific knowledge from other forms of knowledge. From this perspective, they argue that scientific knowledge should be a type of knowledge that is free from all values and can be established through scientific methods.

Such a defense also creates a hierarchical structure in terms of knowledge and fields. According to these thinkers, scientific knowledge holds a superior position compared to all other forms of knowledge. It is not dependent on the individual but on the object independent of the individual. What is interesting here is that the proponents of this view also have a belief in the superiority of science over all other domains. In certain aspects, they have felt the need for an objective basis due to their subjective inclinations.

In conclusion, objectivity in science is both important and controversial. In order to advance the debates in this regard, it is necessary to examine the thoughts of some thinkers on objectivity in science.

1. VİEWS OF SOME THINKERS ON OBJECTIVITY

1.1. The Notion of Objectivity in Logical Positivism

Logical positivists believe that objectivity in science can be achieved through specific methods. They also believe that with these methods, they can distinguish between true knowledge and false knowledge, i.e., non-science.

In this regard, two key aspects can be observed in the foundations of logical positivism. The first is the rejection of metaphysics, as it denies all findings beyond space and time (Özdemir, 2019: 16). The fundamental reason for this is that nothing outside of space and time can be proven. The second aspect is the principle of verification (Özdemir, 2019: 16). For logical positivists, the principle of verification serves as a means to distinguish science from non-science and to conduct science on an objective plane. They base this principle on whether propositions can be verified or not. For example, the claim that people born in May under the Taurus sign are more gentle is invalid from the perspective of logical positivism because it cannot be verified. The principle of verification also entails the rejection of metaphysics, which is the foundation of logical positivism, as metaphysical propositions are not verifiable.

The emergence of this principle is primarily based on Einstein's Theory of Relativity (Ayhan, 2005: 16). According to this principle, the truth of a statement can only be supported through observations. If it is not supported through observations, the proposition is meaningless (Demir, 2012: 47).

According to logical positivists, only verifiable propositions are meaningful. Furthermore, these propositions must be either synthetic or analytic. Based on this, the meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions also becomes apparent (Özdemir, 2019: 19).

This principle of verification also functions as a scientific language. This language enables testing of a proposition by everyone. If a proposition cannot be tested by everyone, it is not a verifiable proposition. Thus, an important criterion of the principle of verification is its openness to everyone. This criterion is crucial for the objectivity of science (Özdemir, 2019: 20).

In conclusion, logical positivists have argued that scientific knowledge allows for objectivity in science. The central principle guiding their view is the principle of verification. Based on this principle, they claim that the most significant factor distinguishing science from other forms of knowledge and separating truth from falsehood is the principle of verification. They believe that even if an individual scientist may introduce their subjectivity into their theories, this objective criterion will reveal it. However, it should be noted that logical positivists do not require a scientist to be objective when selecting a problem. A scientist is not an independent entity within science, free from emotions and thoughts. Nevertheless, their theory is expected to be objectively valid. The criterion for determining this is the principle of verification. However, logical positivists have encountered some problems in this regard.

The fundamental problem faced by logical positivists is the need to reject all metaphysical propositions, while the proposition that all metaphysical propositions should be rejected is itself a metaphysical proposition. (Cottingham, 2003: 122). This clearly reveals an internal contradiction. The rejection of all metaphysical propositions is based on a metaphysical proposition. In this respect, there remains only one possible conclusion: not all metaphysical propositions are invalid. At least one of them is true. In this case, the new argument formula for logical positivists would be as follows:

At most one metaphysical proposition is true. All other metaphysical propositions are meaningless.

This metaphysical proposition is that all metaphysical principles, except for this proposition, are invalid.

At this point, logical positivists will face a problem. Why is at most one metaphysical proposition true? And even if this is accepted, why must the second proposition be true?

The second problem encountered by logical positivists is the degree to which scientific propositions can be verified. Some scientific propositions cannot be fully verified through experimentation. (Cottingham, 2003: 122). The central problem here is the problem of induction. Conducting a limited number of experiments is not sufficient to present a general statement. Furthermore, an infinite number of experiments is not feasible. Therefore, the results presented cannot be fully verified. Logical positivists have attempted to propose various solutions to these problems, but they have been insufficient. However, Karl Popper introduced the principle of falsifiability, which overcomes these challenges.

1.2. Karl Popper's Understanding of Objectivity

Unlike logical positivists, Popper does not concern himself with the problem of induction. He believes that the inductive reasoning used in empirical sciences is flawed. According to Popper, conducting a certain number of experiments does not provide a basis for assuming that the same result will occur infinitely. He asserts that such a conclusion can always be false. Moreover, there is no limiting criterion in induction (Özdemir, 2019: 24).

Popper argues that theories should be tested deductively. He examines this issue from four perspectives: derivability, equivalence, compatibility, and inconsistency. He suggests that a theory should first be examined for internal contradictions, then compared to other theories, and finally subjected to testing. The theories that pass all these stages are considered solid. However, a theory that fails at any of these stages is falsified. Popper's principle of falsifiability is developed based on this foundation (Özsoy, 2018: 212).

Popper's criterion of demarcation is derived from a theory's testability. However, unlike logical positivists, this criterion is based on the falsifiability of the theory (Özdemir, 2019: 26).

To provide an example, consider the proposition "A meteorite may fall to Earth in 500 years." It is difficult to refute such a claim. Moreover, the proposition itself does not express a definite outcome. The statement "may fall" also implies the possibility of not falling. According to Popper, since this proposition lacks a testable and falsifiable aspect, it is an invalid scientific proposition.

Here, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of falsification. According to Popper, insisting on a verificational position is meaningless. A single falsity in a proposition implies that the proposition cannot be generalized. In this regard, the scientific proposition is considered invalid. According to Popper, no matter how much a proposition is verified, it cannot become universally true. It may indicate a step closer to the truth at most. In such a context, the degree of truth is irrelevant. However, for Popper, a single falsification is sufficient to discard a proposition. However, for such falsification to occur, the proposition must be clear and testable. An untestable proposition cannot be falsified. Therefore, all propositions should have the potential for falsification. If a proposition cannot be falsified no matter how much it is tested, it can be considered true in that sense (Çüçen, 2013: 170-171).

From this, it can be understood that Popper is of the view that a kind of objectivity can be achieved in science. Popper establishes a criterion, not the principle of verification like logical positivists, but the principle of falsifiability. With this principle, Popper not only argues that objectivity can exist in science but also establishes a distinction between science and non-science. According to Popper, non-scientific propositions are not falsifiable propositions.

Popper bases the criterion of objectivity on testability among individuals. From one perspective, subjective judgments, no matter how strong they may be, hold no meaning for Popper if they are not testable. Even if a proposition is believed to be true, if it cannot be tested among individuals, it is not a scientific proposition. In this context, Popper also excludes psychological propositions from the equation. The provision of evidence by perceptions is not important either because it is not testable by other individuals (Özdemir, 2019: 29).

The strongest criticism of Popper's viewpoint comes from the history of science. In the past, although certain scientific propositions were falsified in their time, they are currently considered valid. The falsification is also determined by the conditions of the era. In this regard, if Popper's principle of falsifiability were to be applied, all theories that were falsified in their time should be discarded and never reopened for discussion. However, scientific development is filled with theories that were falsified in their time but later gained validity. Popper's principle of falsifiability does not overcome this problem. Thomas Kuhn criticizes Popper on these and similar issues and, as a result, brings forth a new methodology (Özdemir, 2019: 29).

1.3. Thomas Kuhn's Understanding of Objectivity

Thomas Kuhn brought forth criticisms against the notion of cumulative progress in science and the necessity of objectivity in science. The most important concept introduced by Kuhn is the concept of paradigm. Kuhn defines paradigm as a model accepted by everyone, unlike others (Çilingir, 2013: 15).

Kuhn divides scientific revolutions into various stages. These stages are pre-science, normal science, crises, scientific revolution, new normal science, and new crises (Özdemir, 2019: 39).

To better understand the role of the paradigm concept in scientific development, it would be helpful to explain it with an example. As an example, three fundamental scientific paradigms in history can be considered: Aristotle's, Newton's, and Einstein's. These individuals, through their contributions, changed the paradigm in science. According to Kuhn, change occurs during these paradigm shifts. The individuals in these examples have brought about scientific revolutions by presenting paradigms accepted by everyone. According to Kuhn, scientific progress is not possible without these paradigm shifts. His objection to the cumulative understanding of science arises here. Because Kuhn believes that scientific progress does not occur merely by accumulating knowledge. The real progress in science is achieved through these paradigm changes. Therefore, according to Kuhn, this paradigm is essential for scientific progress.

However, there may not always be a dominant paradigm in certain periods. Two theories can gather an equal number of supporters. Kuhn explains this with the concept of incommensurability. At this stage, if the community leans towards one of these theories, then the dominant paradigm is shaped based on that theory (Özdemir, 2019: 39).

According to Kuhn, science progresses within the framework of the dominant paradigm. Instead of adding something outside of the existing paradigm, they add something within that paradigm. At this point, individuals whom Kuhn labels as revolutionaries emerge within the paradigm and challenge the dominant paradigm. Only then can a transition to a new paradigm be achieved. Figures like Einstein are examples of this. (Özdemir, 2019: 40).

In this context, according to Kuhn, there is no objectivity in science as commonly believed. Science textbooks taught during the era of the dominant paradigm impose their own paradigm by disregarding other paradigms. The cumulative progress view presented in these science textbooks is, according to Kuhn, merely an illusion. This perspective is distant from objectivity in certain respects. From these perspectives, science should also take into account subjective viewpoints because scientists are influenced by the existing paradigms. Therefore, according to Kuhn, true neutrality is not possible in science (Özdemir, 2019: 41).

1.4. Paul Karl Feyerabend's Understanding of Objectivity

Feyerabend argues that the distinction between science and non-science is fundamentally unimportant. According to Feyerabend, there is no hierarchical distinction between types of knowledge, and there is no criterion to separate these types of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is just one type of knowledge, similar to other types (Demir, 2012: 134).

Feyerabend believes that there is not a single method. Valuable results can be obtained through various methods. In this context, Feyerabend's principle is anything goes principle (Özdemir, 2019: 33). The fundamental purpose of this principle is to allow the use of anything that proves useful for scientific progress. Restricting oneself to specific methods and not considering anything beyond that would, according to Feyerabend, limit science. Within a limited science, making progress in various aspects would be challenging. However, utilizing any method that works, while bringing different perspectives along, would make it possible to discover previously unexplored things. These discoveries, in turn, would enable scientific progress in certain aspects.

According to Feyerabend, science is not liberating. In fact, he argues that science can become a tool of power in the hands of various authorities. At the same time, there is no freedom in a science understanding that is constrained by various methodologies. Feyerabend's fundamental goal is to create a free environment within the scientific context (Demir, 2012: 135-136).

To eliminate these constraints, Feyerabend introduces epistemological anarchism. Feyerabend also does not view science solely as a means of knowledge and embraces the view of theoretical pluralism. This view consists of two basic principles: the principle of stubbornness and the principle of proliferation (Özdemir, 2019: 35). This theoretical pluralism also implies that benefits can be derived from other types of knowledge. From certain perspectives, irrationality can provide desired outcomes. If such a possibility exists, these possibilities should not be ignored. According to Feyerabend, a diversity of views brings both freedom and benefits from new perspectives.

To explain Feyerabend's principles, the principle of stubbornness represents choosing a theory and defending it regardless of anything. The main purpose of this principle is the possibility that the theory may be correct, even if it approaches being refuted by strong arguments. If the theory is correct and the arguments brought against it are flawed, a correct theory would be destroyed without reason. To prevent such situations, Feyerabend puts forth the principle of stubbornness. This principle protects promising theories.

The principle of proliferation, on the other hand, entails generating theories that are the complete opposite of very strong theories. The fundamental purpose of this principle is the assumption that even very strong theories could be wrong. If these strong theories are incorrect, years of building new theories based on them would lead to progress in the wrong direction, rendering such progress meaningless. To prevent such a situation, new theories that challenge strong theories are put forward. With this principle of proliferation, diversity of views also increases in parallel.

Considering these principles, it is not surprising that Feyerabend criticizes the coherence condition in science. In this coherence condition, new theories are generally built upon accepted theories. However, according to Feyerabend, this does not serve the purpose of protecting better theories. In fact, it merely solidifies the position of the old theory, even if it becomes weaker. This situation poses a problem in terms of progress and freedom. Feyerabend suggests that in science, the coherence condition should not be sought in new theories.

While Feyerabend's proposals promote liberation and significantly increase diversity of views, they also give rise to various problems in terms of consensus. The absence of a specific criterion within science also makes constructing a framework more challenging. The choices between certain theories and paradigms become more ambiguous. This, in turn, makes progress in science more difficult from certain perspectives. Another criticism that can be raised is the lack of fundamental difference between science and other types of knowledge according to Feyerabend's perspective. Pushing science into such a position will greatly reduce confidence in science. Such a decrease in trust also presents various problems. To illustrate this with an example:

Let's say there is a deadly disease spreading. The only way to survive this disease is through a vaccine. If there is no trust in science among the public, it will essentially invite death. This is because if science is not fundamentally different from other types of knowledge, there won't be much justification for choosing scientific knowledge.

CONCLUSION

The issue of objectivity in science appears to be highly controversial and problematic. There is no consensus on the existence of objectivity in science, and it is even difficult to claim that there is agreement on the concept of objectivity itself.

At this point, various thinkers have developed different ideas regarding the possibility or impossibility of objectivity in science. While some defend these ideas, others criticize them. However, it should be noted that the issue of objectivity in science is not solely related to science itself. Science also affects all individuals in the world in certain aspects. If we are to reach a conclusion on the subjectivity of objectivity in science, we should not overlook the other functions that science provides.

As mentioned in this text, the authority of science has importance in various aspects. Losing this importance would lead to problems both from the perspective of science and humanity. When examining the impossibility of achieving complete objectivity in science or the approaches of thinkers on this matter, it becomes apparent that there is no definitive conclusion. It should not be overlooked that subjectivity, i.e., the human factor, plays a role in how individuals approach objects independently of their values, or how objective criteria are derived from subjective contexts.

So, what should our position be if complete objectivity cannot be achieved in science? At this point, the pragmatic approach should be followed. Science should maintain its objective value in the eyes of people. If science maintains its objective value in the eyes of people, it can progress in a favorable environment. The position that scientists and philosophers of science should adopt is to instill the belief that objectivity exists in science, even if it doesn't actually exist. Such objectivity should be ensured.

At this point, science will gain a more favorable ground. It will contribute significantly not only to those who are not solely engaged in science but also to those who are. Even if a scientist acts with subjective tendencies, believing in objectivity will provide them with greater motivation to advance in science. Moreover, the belief in this objectivity will lead to consensus among scientists. Based on this, it is possible to construct a scientific framework for a scientific edifice. Otherwise, progress in a chaotic environment does not seem feasible.

In conclusion, whether objectivity exists or not in science is not the main issue that needs to be debated. Development and utility appear to be more important matters in this regard. It should also be noted that currently there is no consensus on objectivity in science, just as there is no definitive proof for a theory at present does not mean it will never be proven in the future. Science will demonstrate this in the future. If we follow this logic, the absence of objectivity in science at present does not mean that it will never exist. The answer to this will be provided by science in the future.

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